CVE-2025-39915

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: phy: transfer phy_config_inband() locking responsibility to phylink

Problem description

Lockdep reports a possible circular locking dependency (AB/BA) between &pl->state_mutex and &phy->lock, as follows.

phylink_resolve() // acquires &pl->state_mutex -> phylink_major_config() -> phy_config_inband() // acquires &pl->phydev->lock

whereas all the other call sites where &pl->state_mutex and &pl->phydev->lock have the locking scheme reversed. Everywhere else, &pl->phydev->lock is acquired at the top level, and &pl->state_mutex at the lower level. A clear example is phylink_bringup_phy().

The outlier is the newly introduced phy_config_inband() and the existing lock order is the correct one. To understand why it cannot be the other way around, it is sufficient to consider phylink_phy_change(), phylink's callback from the PHY device's phy->phy_link_change() virtual method, invoked by the PHY state machine.

phy_link_up() and phy_link_down(), the (indirect) callers of phylink_phy_change(), are called with &phydev->lock acquired. Then phylink_phy_change() acquires its own &pl->state_mutex, to serialize changes made to its pl->phy_state and pl->link_config. So all other instances of &pl->state_mutex and &phydev->lock must be consistent with this order.

Problem impact

I think the kernel runs a serious deadlock risk if an existing phylink_resolve() thread, which results in a phy_config_inband() call, is concurrent with a phy_link_up() or phy_link_down() call, which will deadlock on &pl->state_mutex in phylink_phy_change(). Practically speaking, the impact may be limited by the slow speed of the medium auto-negotiation protocol, which makes it unlikely for the current state to still be unresolved when a new one is detected, but I think the problem is there. Nonetheless, the problem was discovered using lockdep.

Proposed solution

Practically speaking, the phy_config_inband() requirement of having phydev->lock acquired must transfer to the caller (phylink is the only caller). There, it must bubble up until immediately before &pl->state_mutex is acquired, for the cases where that takes place.

Solution details, considerations, notes

This is the phy_config_inband() call graph:

                      sfp_upstream_ops :: connect_phy()
                      |
                      v
                      phylink_sfp_connect_phy()
                      |
                      v
                      phylink_sfp_config_phy()
                      |
                      |   sfp_upstream_ops :: module_insert()
                      |   |
                      |   v
                      |   phylink_sfp_module_insert()
                      |   |
                      |   |   sfp_upstream_ops :: module_start()
                      |   |   |
                      |   |   v
                      |   |   phylink_sfp_module_start()
                      |   |   |
                      |   v   v
                      |   phylink_sfp_config_optical()

phylink_start() | | | phylink_resume() v v | | phylink_sfp_set_config() | | | v v v phylink_mac_initial_config() | phylink_resolve() | | phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set() v v v phylink_major_config() | v phy_config_inband()

phylink_major_config() caller #1, phylink_mac_initial_config(), does not acquire &pl->state_mutex nor do its callers. It must acquire &pl->phydev->lock prior to calling phylink_major_config().

phylink_major_config() caller #2, phylink_resolve() acquires &pl->state_mutex, thus also needs to acquire &pl->phydev->lock.

phylink_major_config() caller #3, phylink_ethtool_ksettings_set(), is completely uninteresting, because it only call ---truncated---

The CVSS score(s) listed for this vulnerability do not reflect the associated product's status, and are included for informational purposes to better understand the severity of this vulnerability.